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THE SLIPPERY DISCOURSE OF SEXUAL CONSENT:
FEMINIST ACUMEN AND FEMINIST EXCESS
Dan Subotnik*

“The ‘Patriarchy’ did not rape me . . . One man did.”
Wendy McElroy1
“I no longer think about whether I should be offended. Instead, I . . .
know that I am offended [and t]he result is a feeling of wholeness.”
Catherine Wells 2

* Dan Subotnik is Professor of Law at Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center. He thanks: Professors Myra Berman, Rena Seplowitz, Richard Klein,
Rodger Citron, and Danielle Schwager, Jane Doe, a PhD associate who wishes to
remain anonymous, student John LoNigro, and Touro Career Planning Officer
Margaret Williams for inspired editorial assistance; librarians Laura Ross, Beth
Chamberlain, Irene McDermott, and Michael Tatonetti for their expert research
help; his official Research Assistants Siara Ossa, Taylor Bialek, and Rachel
Silverstein and his unofficial Research Assistant Ezra Bouskela; his Touro Law
Review editor Daniel Parise; and, above all, his wife of over fifty years Rose R.
Subotnik, for assistance across the board. Other works by this author include: The
Cult of Hostile Gender Climate: A Male Preaches Diversity to the Choir, 8 U. CHI.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 37 (2001); TOXIC DIVERSITY: RACE, GENDER AND LAW
TALK IN AMERICA (NYU 2005); “Hands Off”: Sex Feminism, Affirmative Consent
and the Law of Foreplay, 16 SO. CAL. REV. OF L. & JUST. 149 (2007); Copulemus
in Pace, 41 U. AKRON L. REV. 847 (2008); Assaulting the Facts, 30 ACAD.
QUESTIONS 225 (2017).
1
WENDY MCELROY, RAPE CULTURE HYSTERIA: FIXING THE DAMAGE DONE TO
MEN AND WOMEN 6 (2016).
2
Catherine Wells, The Theory and Practice of Being Trina: A Remembrance of
Trina Grillo, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1381, 1387 (1997) (emphasis in original). Wells
teaches at Boston College Law School. For an early hint of what’s coming, the
reader might want to consider: Is it even conceivable that a man had written this
about anything?

759

760

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

ABSTRACT
The Kavanaugh confirmation hearings, the Harvey Weinstein
case, and the Jeffrey Epstein case have done us a valuable service.
By focusing mass media attention and academic discourse on consent
to sex and on assault, they have brought to a boil two issues that have
been simmering for some time in feminist circles. The present essay
invites readers to consider feminist writings over the last half-century
that have influenced this discourse and continue to incite febrile talk
today.
First to be examined is the American “heartbalm” regime, an
early effort to protect women from the emotional harm resulting from
seduction by fraud, breach of promise to marry, and similar
objectionable behavior, some of which, it has been argued, vitiates
consent and should be actionable. We then examine assertions of
women’s non-consent that have been used to justify new, heavy
regulation: the fundamentality of rape (Susan Brownmiller),
“dominance feminism” (Catharine MacKinnon), and related claims of
women’s lack of agency (Robin West). These claims are set against
rejoinders that women are much more powerful in the sexual realm
than as portrayed by the critics, and that, by extension,
determinations of legal consent should not be left only to the critics.
This will bring us to an evaluation of affirmative consent as a tool for
ensuring real agreement.
The essay goes on to highlight the absence of reliable data on
campus sexual assault. While stressing the obligation to confront
such assault whenever it takes place, this discussion examines the gap
between the one-in-five sexual assault data point famously reported
by President Obama (i.e., the chances for women to be assaulted
during their college years) and the much lower rates recorded in other
studies, including so-called university Clery reports.
These
uncertainties would seem to militate against the stereotyping of
college men as brutes, a state of affairs that is perhaps best reflected
in the report of four Harvard women law professors detailing what
they consider the “shocking” treatment of men in assault
investigations.
Focus then shifts to the #MeToo-related claim (Deborah
Tuerkheimer) that, no “ifs” or “buts” provided, women should be
believed in he said/she said cases. Analogizing rape to robbery—
with neither consideration of their contextual difference nor concern
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with due process rights of men—this claim seems premised on the
idea that no one questions the actual occurrence of a reported
robbery.
What follows is an argument against simply believing a
woman’s assault complaint. Emanating straight from the trenches
and provided by an experienced sexual assault investigator and
former law school dean (Joan Howarth), this argument underscores
the sexual ambivalence and confusion she found over the years in
women complainants.
Discussion turns finally to a common feature of much current
discourse, one that is exemplified throughout this article: an attitude
of self-righteousness made unapologetically manifest in the Wells
epigraph above. This arrogance has induced men to step back in
assault discussions, which, in turn, has precluded understanding of
sexual dynamics, is condescending to women though upholding their
primacy, and tends to poison gender relations on campus and
elsewhere.
A MAN WITH A PLAN
Is the sexual environment we have created for ourselves a
healthy and happy one, or at least close to the best that we can
realistically devise? Or, perhaps, is major new regulation required?
These questions have spawned a large academic literature
over the years. The #MeToo movement, the Blasey Ford/Kavanaugh,
the Epstein, and the Weinstein cases have only increased public
interest in women’s safety. It seems useful then to review the flow of
related works to contextualize the current moment’s urgent calls for
change. To help deal with the large volume of relevant writings, this
essay will often draw on examinations of the literature through my
related work surveying the legal academic terrain of consent over the
past twenty-five years.
The views to be presented here cannot help but be influenced
by my sex. The reader should not be concerned, however, that
women’s voices will be marginalized. Because women’s consent is
at the heart of most writing in this area, most opinion drawn on here
will be that of women. Men’s voices, by contrast, have been
discouraged. Attempting to keep female control of discourse, to
illustrate, a new book on law school gender climate tries to preempt a
male pushback by labeling it in advance as “mansplaining, hepeating,
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and whitesplaining.”3 I have not yielded to this gambit; nevertheless,
“Slippery Slope” will be no masculinist romp.
To further allay concerns about my subject position, I
stipulate up front: #MeToo has shown in detail the harm wrought by
sexual assault, harm that is compounded when authorities fail to
investigate and prosecute. 4 The invasion of the body makes sexual
assault nothing less than savagery; no healthy community can tolerate
it.
But “power sex” (sex based on male physical and social
power), I argue here, makes up only a part of the contemporary story
of sexual relations. I further argue that some feminists have been too
willing to stereotype men; that many of their public representations of
female sexuality are tendentiously unrealistic; that men as a class are
not guilty of sexual assault as charged; and that the number of
wrongly accused men on college campuses is likely a good bit higher
than reported.5 In short, the central message of this essay is that
while the feminist spotlight on sexual assault has helped build a
healthier community, it has at the same time left serious burn marks
that need attention. Feminist acumen, that is, coexists with feminist
excess.

3

See MEERA E. DEO. UNEQUAL PROFESSION: RACE AND GENDER IN LEGAL
ACADEMIA 43 (2019) (lamenting the rhetorical strategies of white men when under
attack). For a review of this book, see Dan Subotnik, Are Law Schools Oppressing
Minority Faculty Women? A Critique of Meera E. Deo, “Unequal Profession: Race
Gender in Legal Academia” 37 TOURO L. REV. 741 (2021).
4
A new article reports that in six American counties a decade ago only one-fifth of
sexual assault reports led to an arrest, 1.6% led to trial. See Her Word Against His,
ECONOMIST
(Jan.
4,
2020),
https://www.economist.com/international/2020/01/04/why-so-few-rapists-areconvicted. America’s National Criminal Justice Reference Service conducted a
study on six American counties and found that between 2008 and 2012, only onefifth of sexual assault reports led to an arrest, and only 1.6% of reports led to trial.
Id.
5
See Howarth, infra note 106. Men of color may suffer the most harm, being
disproportionately accused by alleged victims. See Emily Yoffee, The Question of
Race in Campus Sexual-Assault Cases, THE ATL. (Sept. 11, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/the-question-of-race-incampus-sexual-assault-cases/539361.
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BATTLE BASICS
Making the case of feminist bias against men almost thirty
years ago, Professor Alan Dershowitz, then in his halcyon days,
described a discursive environment that has stifled frank discussion
on sexual assault.6 “Women. . . are entirely free to attack. . . men in
the most offensive of terms. Radical feminists can accuse all men of
being rapists . . . without fear of discipline or rebuke.”7
Have attacks such as Dershowitz’s been fueled by a political
agenda? Say, by a restless antipathy towards men, one born perhaps
of frustration with dependence on men, 8 one that is not limited by
national borders and may be captured by a new jeremiad, “I Hate
Men.”?9 If so, toward what specific goal? Energizing women to
confront an identified enemy? Strengthening social bonds between
women by giving them common cause? Dershowitz did not say. In
any event, the stereotyping of men by academics, as we shall see,
continues to the present day, and is reflected throughout this essay. If
sex itself scrambles the mind (in ways we shall take note of), does
writing about sex do the same?10
Readers might begin considering: (1) to what extent have the
critiques been fair?; (2) if men, especially on campus, have allowed
themselves to be intimidated in this realm—if when struck they still
chivalrously keep their rhetorical swords sheathed—what does this
say about “patriarchal” power?; and (3) finally, are there ways in
which an undecided male scholar might offer something of value to
his female colleagues?
6

See Alan Dershowitz, Harvard Witch Hunt Burns the Incorrect at the Stake, L.A.
TIMES (April 22, 1992) at B7.
7
Id.
8
It seems fair to speculate that men’s hostility to women is tied to the same kind of
frustration with dependency.
9
PAULINE HARMANGE, I HATE MEN, (Natasha Lehrer trans. 2021) (2021). The
book, which first appeared in French, is being translated into seventeen languages.
See also Laura Cappelle, With ‘I Hate Men,’ a French Feminist Touches a Nerve,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/10/books/paulineharmange-i-hate-men.html.
10
See Robin West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 149,
214 (2000) (“women have a seemingly endless capacity to lie, both to [them]selves
and others, about what gives [them] pain and what gives [them] pleasure.”).
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My message here can in a sense be reduced to nine words
borrowed from author and rape victim Wendy McElroy: “[t]he
‘[p]atriarchy’ did not rape me . . . [a] man did.”11 This message can
be usefully juxtaposed with one from well-known feminist law
professor, Joan C. Williams. Citing the indebtedness of her own
scholarly philosophy to John Dewey’s prioritization of values over
logic as a source of truth—a basic anti-foundationalist position—
Williams goes on to announce the mission of her book: “[M]y goal,”
she announces, “is not to deliver the truth but to inspire social
change,” a radically relativist formulation that is not so easily
defended.12 For viewed as a scholarly raison d’être, this statement
can be reasonably taken to mean that when facing a choice between
pursuing truth logically and promoting a self-interested position,
Williams would opt for the latter.
From Williams’ statement of her own mission, it seems a fair
step to hypothesize that at least some women academics see
themselves first as activists, and only then as (dispassionate)
scholars.13 And probably as a result, at least some of their theorizing
about heated matters such as sexual engagement has gone awry, even
badly awry. For truth to be objective, it cannot in the end be
sacrificed to the fight for social justice, whose meaning is so
contentious. And whatever their salubrious side, it should not be
hard to imagine that messages like Williams’ which, as we shall see,
place the burden of solving women’s problems on men, damages
both personal and professional relations between the sexes, a not
insignificant part of American economic and social life. Given this
possibility, a scholar aiming for objectivity would be wise to read
Williams and like-minded writers—a number of whom are discussed
in this essay—with strict scrutiny.
Another warning: Frank talk about assault and sexual consent
can be unsettling. Would that it were otherwise, but exploring these
topics necessitates close concentration on the pathways to sex,
something law review readers may not be primed for. That it is a
man, a borderline octogenarian at that, who is writing here about the

11

See MCELROY, supra note 1, at 6.
JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 244 (2000).
13
Id.
12

AND

WORK CONFLICT
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sexual experience of women one-third his age may be doubly
troubling. If as a result a trigger warning is warranted, this is it.
A WHITE LIE?
Consider the following circumstances. Harry meets Hilda at
an end-of-semester bash. Inspired by alcohol or drugs both before
and during the party, and encouraged by friends, they bond quickly.
A little later, Hilda asks Harry whether he is married. He says no.
Still later that night they retire to Harry’s—or Hilda’s—place,
disrobe, and have sex. That begins an intense relationship, though
Hilda gets a little uneasy because Harry is not available on weekends,
claiming to be out of town. A few months later Hilda learns
conclusively about Harry’s married status, cannot bear to continue
the relationship, and brings an action against him for fraud. Might
Hilda have a cause of action against Harry?
This scenario came to me in 1994 while reading Professor
Jane Larson’s intriguing article in the Columbia Law Review titled
“Women Know So Little, They Call My Good Nature ‘Deceit’: A
Feminist Rethinking of Seduction.”14
In effect, Larson was
reminding readers that in the case of an automobile accident, we take
into account not only financial damage to the plaintiff but also the
pain and suffering to the victim flowing from the accident. 15 That is,
all damage to the victim can be compensated. Even without an
accident, for that matter, one can be liable for a lie. If, for example, I
tell someone that his mother was just murdered when I know she
wasn’t, I could be liable for knowingly inflicting emotional harm.16
None of this will be new to the law-trained reader.
Writing as a “feminist,” Larson suggested that the wrong in
the Hilda-Harry scenario can be at least as harmful, and may be more
harmful than, say, the emotional injury resulting from an automobile
accident, and thus the matter should be justiciable.17 In essence, there
14

See Jane Larson, Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature
‘Deceit’: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1993).
15
See id.
16
See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous
Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42 (1983).
17
See Larson, supra note 14, at 374.
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is no consent to sex, any more than consent to buying a car, when the
deal is founded on a lie: e.g., the “car” lacks a carburetor. Surely few
will doubt that extensive psychic damage can be wrought by a sexual
lie; but did the law need to intervene here on the woman’s behalf?
Given the considerable amount of playacting/roleplaying that goes on
in intimate relationships, I was intrigued, but dubious, and wrote a
long article in rebuttal.18
Larson’s argument needs context. For at least eighty years,
beginning in about the 1850s, the law protected women against such
fraud under “heartbalm” rules, which allowed women to bring civil
claims against men for seduction, for breach of promise to marry, and
for alienation of affection (upsetting the marital relationship
thereby).19 During those times, Hilda could have won her case for
seduction if she could have proved misrepresentation, reliance, and
emotional damage.
By the late 1930s, a fair part of heartbalm protections had
been swept away; Hilda would have no case today. 20 Why? One
thing has become clear: women were actively engaged in the
movement to repeal it. 21 Is it possible that the elation produced by
the successful drive for the franchise led many women to feel that
they no longer needed the law to protect them from emotional harm?
Certainly, cultural evidence points in this direction: the women
idealized in 1930s American films were not weak and timid. They
were fast-talking women of the world: consider Katharine Hepburn,
Joan Crawford, Bette Davis who wore shoulder pads and saw
themselves as giving back as good as they got; they could fend for
18

See Dan Subotnik, Sue Me, Sue Me, What Can You Do Me? I Love You: A
Disquisition on Law, Sex, and Talk, 47 FLA. L. REV. 311 (1995). A recent article
reports on a study finding that “[m]any people . . . believe that an individual can
give consent even though she was lied to by the person seeking her consent.”
Roseanna Sommers, You Were Duped Into Saying Yes. Is That Still Consent?, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/05/opinion/sexualconsent.html. Sommers teaches law at the University of Michigan. Id.
19
See Larson, supra note 14, at 394.
20
For a retrospective on heartbalm regimes and their conclusion, see Tori Telfer,
How the “Heart Balm Racket” Convinced America That Women Were Up to No
Good,
SMITHSONIAN
MAG.
(Feb.
13,
2018),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-heart-balm-racket-convincedamerica-women-were-no-good-180968144.
21
Id. Some women were in the forefront of the anti-heartbalm movement. See
Larson, supra note 14, at 397 n.93.
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themselves perfectly well (at least until the final clinch).22 Women’s
seeming rejection of heartbalm may also be connected to the flapperera notion that sex out of wedlock, far from morally tainting, could
actually be uplifting. Here again cultural evidence supports this
notion: pre-code movies of the late 1920s and 1930s showed many
women strikingly unencumbered by puritan mores. 23 By the end of
the twentieth century, heartbalm was largely dead. 24
If torts teachers raise the issue of heartbalm today, their
number is small.25 And yet Larson was not wholly wrong; people do
get hurt by lies, sometimes badly. But still it was intriguing that
Larson could only barely discern that women tell lies too. Among
the most notable of these, one can surmise, “I am not seeing anyone
else now”; “I am using birth control”; “No kidding, I am a Methodist
too”; and “of course, you are the father of the child—who else could
be?” Heartbalm if restored, in other words, would catch both male
and female scoundrels in its net. 26
Extrapolating from Larson, one might wonder about the
current need to see women only as innocent and men only as their
tormentors, as opposed to seeing men and women as two groups
often struggling, however awkwardly, instinctively, and self
destructively at times, to satisfy physical and companionship needs.
Furthermore, if women eighty-five years ago acted on the belief that
they could look after themselves quite well and no longer needed (if
they ever did) to sue men over the predictable sequelae of canoodling
22

See, e.g., Julie Human, A Woman Rebels? Gender Roles in 1930s Motion
Pictures, 98 REG. OF THE KY. HIST. SOC’Y, 405, 407, 418 (2000).
23
See, e.g., MICK LASALLE, COMPLICATED WOMEN: SEX AND POWER IN PRE-CODE
HOLLYWOOD (2000).
24
But not in parts of the world influenced by British law. See Jianlin Chen, Lying
About God (And Love?) To Get Laid: The Case Of Criminalizing Sex Under
Religious False Pretense In Hong Kong, 51 Cornell Int’l L. J. 553 (2018).
25
Subotnik, supra note 18. At the time I wrote “Sue Me,” I looked hard for
contrary evidence. In preparing this article, I again found no references to
heartbalm in law texts, though I do not claim to have proved a negative. Id.;
Sommers, supra note 18. In her large empirical study, PhD psychologist and
University of Michigan law professor Roseanna Sommers reports that “most” of
her interview subjects did not consider Harry to be guilty of rape. Id. Sommers
does not break down opinion by sex of study subjects. Id.
26
Readers who believe that such misstatements of truth are insubstantial should
imagine that that they come in response to an explicit and urgent inquiry by the
other party.
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on the sofa—all this while enjoying only a fraction of the social,
economic, and political power they have today, why would they want
to resuscitate heartbalm? What new vulnerability did Larson
uncover?
AGAINST OUR WILL?
Larson could not help but direct readers’ attention back to
Susan Brownmiller who, in 1975, initiated the modern conversation
about sexual assault with her bestselling “Against Our Will: Men,
Women and Rape,” spawning a literature that I have spent much of
the last two decades assessing.27 Brownmiller starts out in the distant
past, first noting the inattention to rape by such canonical figures as
Freud and Marx, then hypothesizing the emergence of rape in
prehistoric times, proposing that “[W]hen men discovered that they
could rape, they proceeded to do it,” and ranking “[m]an’s discovery
that his genitalia could serve as a weapon to generate fear with the
discovery of fire.”28 Two sentences later she lays down a grand
stereotype, dramatically concluding that rape is “nothing more or less
than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all
women in a state of fear.” 29 The woman reader might want to pause
to consider whether she is living her life in a “state of fear?”30
The logical inference a male reader could make from
Brownmiller’s assertions might well be a self-interrogating
syllogism: Through rape, I. all men terrorize; II. I am a man; III.
Ergo, I am a terrorist. Certainly, for what it is worth, that was its
effect on me. Were my male friends and I stereotypical rapeterrorists? Should I respond to an attack that felt so personal, or
would my response be taken as evidence of guilt? In any case, it
27

See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE
(1975); see Dan Subotnik, “Hands Off”: Sex, Feminism, Affirmative Consent and
The Law of Foreplay: 16 S. CAL. REV. OF L. & SOC. JUST. 249 (2007); see Dan
Subotnik, Copulemus in Pace: A Meditation on Rape, Affirmative Consent to Sex,
and Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 847 (2008).
28
BROWNMILLER, supra note 27, at 14-15. The vividness of this image should not
be allowed to obscure its hypothetical status.
29
Id. at 15; see also ANN J. CAHILL, RETHINKING RAPE 1 (2001) (explaining that
“the threat of rape…constitutes a persistent and pervasive element in women’s
lives. . . . Rape,” she continues, “has never been far from my experiences.”).
30
BROWNMILLER, supra note 27, at 15.
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seems fair to say that American views of heterosexuality have been
careening in the resulting turbulence ever since.
In the legal academic community, Harvard Law professor
Catharine MacKinnon ran most aggressively with this message of
male exploitation and female fear, producing a theory that came to be
well-known as “Dominance Feminism.” 31 In so doing, she set the
agenda and tone for much contemporary feminist discourse, while
famously—and much to her credit—paving the way for sexual
harassment to be thought of as a form of sexual assault.32
It should not be surprising, then, that MacKinnon, the
towering figure in the field of sexual politics, seems to find nothing
positive for women in sex itself. Nor have many other law
academics, at least in print. Indeed, Professor Janet Halley
announced twenty-five years later that she had “not found anyone
determined to produce a theory of politics of women’s heterosexual
desire for masculinity in men. It’s just missing.”33 “How bizarre!” a
proud and randy woman might well gasp. How to explain Halley’s
finding? Can it be that acknowledgment of Saturday night fevers
would vitiate the case against men? For if sex can bring relief, if it
can actually be fun, then maybe women are not abused thereby.
Put otherwise, if women do not hunger for sex, if sex, that is,
can only be imposed on them, sexual assault becomes easy to define.
“Politically, I call it rape whenever a woman has sex and feels
violated,” declared MacKinnon early in her career, in a statement less
self-evident in its truth than may initially appear to be the case. 34
Why credit only women’s stated feelings about these instances and
not those of men? Because men speak through their consuming sex
drives, which vitiates their credibility.
To sum up, in MacKinnon’s world of Dominance Feminism
we find no spontaneous and exuberant rolls in the hay for women. In
this world, women fall prey to men’s systematic abuse of power,
31

CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32 (1987).
See Deborah Dinner, A Firebrand Flickers, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Mar.–Apr. 2006.
See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN, A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
33
See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM
FEMINISM 65 (2006). “Leaving sex to the feminists is like letting your dog
vacation at the taxidermist. 2 ALAN SOBLE, SEX FROM PLATO TO PAGLIA: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 738 (2006) (quoting Paglia).
34
MACKINNON, supra note 31, at 81-82.
32
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because, starting with sex, underlying virtually all sex is a
fundamental condition of inequality, and “inequalities are coercive
conditions.”35 In evaluating these inequalities, MacKinnon instructs
us to make the assumption that “money functions as a form of force
in sex”36—as if women have not been rebuffing rich men as well as
poor for millennia, as if Cinderella was no match for the prince. In
our own time, we can note, even Hollywood kingmaker Harvey
Weinstein had to struggle to find partners of his choosing.
GIVING AND GETTING
Also building the case against men by underscoring the
oppressive side of sex—while ignoring any liberating side—was
Georgetown Law professor Robin West. 37 For her, except perhaps in
committed relationships, the woman defines herself as “as a being
who ‘gives’ sex, so that she will not become a being from whom sex
is taken.”38 West reinforced her complaint this way: “[I]f a man
wants sex and his female partner doesn’t, they will [copulate] more
often will than won't.”39 But even if so, does the law need to step up
to protect women from the alleged hedonic and bargaining
inequality?
In explicit or implicit exchange for sex, one can ask, might
not the woman be positioned to bargain for something she likes more
than she dislikes sex and be happier as a result? Perhaps visiting her
family rather than her mate’s at Christmas or sleeping late Sunday
mornings while her mate walks her dog. In five words, nationally
known literary critic Camille Paglia sought to solve the bargainingCATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 247 (2007).
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 448
(2016). Interesting perhaps to note, that unlike generations of parents who
encouraged their daughters to marry well, MacKinnon seemed to be urging
daughters not to consort with wealthier men since absent social and financial
equality, which for MacKinnon is uncommon, there can be no meaningful sexual
consent. Id. In this setting, women would generally experience sex as assaultive.
Id. More important, can great beauty, charm, intelligence, music-making not also
be a “form” of force? See id.
37
West, supra note 10, at 165 (2000).
38
Id. But even in these relationships women are put upon. “If what we need to do
to survive, materially and psychically, is have heterosexual penetration . . . then
we’ll do it, and … [w]e’ll report as pleasure what we feel as pain.” Id. at 214.
39
Subotnik, supra note 27, at 850-51.
35
36
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power issue: “We have what they want” 40; “Feminism, coveting
social power, is blind to women’s cosmic sexual power.”41
Perhaps not just cosmically but also comically blind. “If
there’s a man who might be up for having sex with you,”
Cosmopolitan editor and “Sex and the Single Girl” author Helen
Gurley Brown was not advising her young readers a decade later to
call the cops, run away, or sue him as a harasser; rather, “take him to
Gucci.”42
We should not imagine that the dynamics of sexual
interaction have changed over time. A few years after Gurley Brown
weighed in, Northwestern University media studies professor Laura
Kipnis responded sharply to the complaint that most women were
suffering from unbearable sexual demands by their long-term mates:
“Pricey dinners, diamond rings . . . in what other system of exchange
can you trade exclusive access to an orifice for a suburban split level
and a lifetime of money support?” 43 “Not such a bad deal,” she
answered herself, “considering the backbreaking and alienated things
people end up doing for money.”44
Women’s sexual power has reportedly not waned since.
“What many [feminists] don’t seem to see,” best-selling author
Meghan Daum has recently noted, “are the countless ways that
women frequently have power over men: in the use of sex as a tool
for manipulation . . . in the ability nowadays to shut down a
conversation by citing male privilege.”45
MY SEX AND ME
Not all injury, of course, is compensable in money and power.
For at least some feminists, coitus can be, above all, amputative,
40

CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEX, ART AND AMERICAN CULTURE 62 (1992).
Camille Paglia, Perspective Needed – Feminism’s Lie: Denying Reality About
Sexual
Power
and
Rape,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Feb.
17,
1991),
https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/?date=19910217&slug=1266788.
42
MAUREEN DOWD, ARE MEN NECESSARY? 177 (2005) (quoting Helen Gurley
Brown, Don’t Give Up on Sex After 60, NEWSWEEK, May 29, 2000, at 55).
43
LAURA KIPNIS, THE FEMALE THING: DIRT, ENVY, SEX, VULNERABILITY 123
(2007).
44
Id.
45
MEGHAN DAUM, THE PROBLEM WITH EVERYTHING: MY JOURNEY THROUGH THE
NEW CULTURE WARS 84 (2019).
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which would tend to support coming down hard on women’s sexual
partners. “Sex is not something that I ‘own’ and can give away,”
explains professor of philosophy Ann Cahill, because “such a model
of possession suggests that ‘I’ exist as myself separate from my
sexuality.”46
We need to home in on this identity theory. If a woman’s sex
is indeed to be thought of as a limb, the law clearly makes it
unalienable.47 But even assuming for the moment that it is so to be
treated, the alternative to bargaining need not be unwilling
submission; it can also be withdrawal. No one is forcing Cahill to
build an intimate personal life around a man, much less for Hilda to
be in Harry’s bedroom late at night, unless she has bold plans. 48
Given that most sexual assault is by men who are known to
complainants (not by strangers), a stance of social distancing will
often shield a woman from having to bargain—while also greatly
lowering the rate of sexual assault. 49 To respond more conceptually
to Cahill and also to help dial down the rhetoric, since a woman is
likely to have multiple sex partners during her life, “giving” sex
would not violate the law, as it more resembles a loan than a sale.
The central factual question, of course, is whether women
actually have the proprietary feelings about their bodies that can
serve as a foundation for law reform? Some may; Blasey Ford comes
to mind. And yet, the sexual revolution has pushed hard in the
opposite direction, i.e., to demolish views like Cahill’s that the soul
resides in the loins. Women like long-time Cosmopolitan editor-inchief and Gucci shill Helen Gurley Brown were generals as well as

46

ANN J. CAHILL, RETHINKING RAPE 183 (2001). Pointing out the effects of sexual
assault is helpful, but one has to be careful. Paglia captures the downside. “The
whole system [of feminist understanding] now is designed to make you feel that
you are maimed and mutilated forever if . . . [sexual assault] happens.” PAGLIA,
supra note 40, at 63. Can such teaching be helpful to women in distress?
47
42 U.S.C. § 274e (2007).
48
In other words, if most sexual assault is not by strangers (see next note), women
will have some power to avoid men with sexual designs on them by not inviting
them to their bedrooms.
49
Seventy-eight percent of assaults are by people known to their victims, twentytwo percent are by strangers. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248471, RAPE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE-AGE-FEMALES, 1995-2013 at
7 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf.
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front-line soldiers in that uprising. 50 It seems fair to conclude that
today many, if not most, women lead their lives more à la Brown
than à la Cahill. The resulting culture is drenched in sex. Women
read, watch, circulate, and produce porn, which would make it hard
to find agreement for regulating couplings, except, of course, where
force is used, a matter that we will soon address. To nail the point
down, in a hook-up culture that is well established, many young
women today seem to view their sexual parts more as practical
resources and less as holy relics. 51
AMBIGUOUS CONSENT
Recognizing that risks of sex and double standards still at play
contributed to frequent ambivalence about sex among women (to be
discussed at some length below), reformers in the first decade of this
century homed in on affirmative consent as a way to ensure that
women truly wanted the sex that was being offered. Under the
affirmative consent, the pursuer, usually presumed to be a male, must
show that he has a clear signal to proceed. Ambiguous signals in this
view do not count; consent must be “affirmatively displayed.”52 But
how much active support among young women is there for
affirmative consent? This author has yet to find a single study on the
subject, and not for lack of trying. If we are to allow the long arm of
the law to reach down into our sex lives, surely we need good
surveys, not only philosophical ruminations.
The only relevant study cleverly, albeit obliquely, showed
resistance to affirmative consent among women (and men). In the
mid-1990s two women psychology professors surveyed male and
female students to determine how they displayed their consent to

50

See Maureen Dowd, Men Might Be Able To Solve All Their Problems With A
Little Blue Pill, But For Women, Things Are A Bit More Complicated, GLOBE &
MAIL (May 30, 2000), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/men-might-be-ableto-solve-all-their-problems-with-a-little-blue-pill-but-for-women-things-are-a-bitmore-complicated/article767974.
51
Sex is a “female resource” for social exchange; male sex, by contrast has no
“exchange value.” Roy F Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs, Sexual Economics; Sex
as Female Resource in Social Exchange in Heterosexual Interactions, 8
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 339, 341-42 (2004).
52
10 U.S.C. § 920(g)(7) (2019).
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sex.53 The choice for study subjects was Direct Verbal, Indirect
Verbal, Direct Nonverbal, Indirect nonverbal, and None of the
Above.54 This last option received a strong plurality of the votes.
Many of the interviewees were reluctant to communicate yes by word
or deed. As the authors put it without explanation, students were
“letting their partners undress them, not stopping them from kissing
or touching them, not saying no.”55 That is, any ambivalence about
sex was resolved in part by not articulating to their partners the very
thing they told the interviewer they were ready for: sex. Hardly
affirmative support for affirmative consent, morally or legally.
Should we be forcing such a policy on our students?
In light of the protean nature of desire, some academics
nevertheless insist that those on the verge of sex first ascertain
whether sufficient mutuality exists at the critical moment. 56 But is
sex meant to be fundamentally discursive (words spoken out loud) or
bodily (a mindful physicality)?57 In their study of campus sex, two
Columbia University researchers lament their findings on what
“consent frequently looks . . . like” today [in text messages]: “U up?”
“Yep.” “Can I come over?” “Sure.” “We have to do better,”
conclude the authors. 58 But can we really do better? They might not
consider it ideal, but students today, the study shows, may be looking
less for a meeting of minds than one only of genitals.
EQUALITY FOR SOME
Some rape law reformers have used fear of sexually
transmitted disease as a tool in their work, and at least one man is
53

Susan E. Hickman & Charlene L. Muehlenhard, By the Semi-Mystical
Appearance of a Condom: How Young Women and Men Communicate Sexual
Consent in Heterosexual Situations, 36 J. SEX. RES. 258, 262-63 (1999).
54
Id. at 264.
55
Id. at 271. This begs the question: Why are women reluctant to say no? For a
plausible answer, see infra notes 106–21 and accompanying text.
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See Baumeister & Vohs, supra note 51, at 346.
57
Under a “negotiation” model, Professor Michelle Anderson proposes as a test for
moral if not legal sex: Did a conversation occur that “request[ed]. . . information
about another person’s desires and boundaries,” did it express “willingness to
consider the other person’s inclinations and humanity[?]” See Michelle J.
Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV 1401, 1423 (2005).
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JENNIFER S. HIRSCH & SHAMUS KHAN, SEXUAL CITIZENS: A LANDMARK STUDY
OF SEX, POWER, AND ASSAULT ON CAMPUS, at X (2020).
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involved in this effort. In 2005 Yale’s Ian Ayres and Chicago Kent’s
Katherine Baker announced a far-reaching plan.59 Concerned that
seventeen and one-half percent of fifteen to forty-nine year-old men
had genital herpes, that twenty-five percent of sexually active
teenagers are beset by an STD, that only one percent of rape cases
involve use of a condom, and that forty-six percent of an average
woman’s sex acts are with one-off partners, the authors proposed
criminalizing first-time sex with a partner unless a condom is used or
the woman gives explicit consent.60 The penalty would be up to three
months in prison.
If Ayres and Baker had stopped there, the proposal might
have resonated. The problem is that the reformers exempted women
from the reach of the proposed statute. Why the dispensation? Maleto-female transmission of STDs, they explained, is far higher than the
reverse; in the case of HIV, it is up to twenty times as high. 61 More
important, if women are made accountable, they may not report the
self-implicating criminal act.
But those explanations may hide the most fundamental motive
for what some might imagine a constitutionally questionable
proposal. If indeed it was to limit the transmission of STDs, would
the better course of action be to include women in the targeted group?
A woman would be less likely to engage in risky behavior if she put
herself in legal as well as in biological jeopardy thereby.
Additionally, she would be less likely to pass an STD to a man. This
suggests that the reformers’ goal may have been less to limit the
incidence of sexual assault, as claimed, and more to hand the woman
who had unprotected sex a cudgel to beat down the man.
RAPE HYSTERIA?
Brownmiller and MacKinnon would surely reject this image
on a theory that women’s exemption from charges of unprotected sex
is likely far outweighed by benefits of underscoring the significant
risk of being raped, through which, again, Brownmiller reported, “all

59

See Ian Ayres and Katharine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 599 (2005).
60
Id. at 604.
61
Id. at 605.
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men keep all women in a state of fear.”62 This fear—like many of our
other fears—could be deeply distressing, even debilitating. So how
extensive is the fear? Extensive enough to justify radical change in
patterns of current sexual engagement? Two early articles begin an
answer, a 1985 piece (published shortly after Brownmiller’s book)
concluding that the data did “not support the contention that the fear
of rape is universal among women” 63 and a 1989 study holding that
the fear “appears disproportionate to the actual risks women face.” 64
Recent quantitative research is more telling. According to
Gallup in 2018, thirty-six percent of women reported experiencing
fear of assault frequently or occasionally. 65 But that unsettling data
point needs context. According to a concurrent Gallup report,
seventy-one percent of men and women report occasional or frequent
fear of losing a credit card or having financial information stolen by
computer hackers.66 Relatedly, sixty-seven percent of survey
subjects, including men and women, report fear of identity theft. 67
Fear of sexual assault then is palpable, but if the more frequent fear
of identity theft does not preclude most women from living their lives
in relative peace, to what extent can the much less frequent fear of
assault justify a regulatory reordering of our sex lives?
Two professors offered a provocative theory about the fear of
rape when concluding that “the clustered perceptions women acquire
about rape appear to have a self-fulfilling fear effect.”68 Among the
sources of those perceptions, the authors mention mass media and

62

See BROWNMILLER, supra note 27, at 15.
Mark Warr, Fear of Rape Among Urban Women, 32 SOC. PROBS. 248, 248
(1985).
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Justin McCarthy, In Year Two of #MeToo, Fears About Sexual Assault Remain,
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(Nov.
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2018),
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parents.69 Could Brownmiller, MacKinnon, West et al. be another
source of the excessive fear? 70
In any case, the primary objective measure against which fear
of rape needs to be evaluated is the frequency of rape. Barack
Obama stunned the nation when in 2014 he reported that one in five
undergraduates is sexually assaulted during her four college years, or
very roughly—to keep the math simple—five percent per year.71 The
political and social reverberations are still being felt.
A raft of reports came out at about the same time. In her 2016
book “Rape Culture Hysteria,” Wendy McElroy tried to make sense
of the widely disparate results from these studies. 72 Relying on the
National Crime Victimization Study, published by the Bureau of
Justice Statistics in December 2014, McElroy concludes that the rate
of rape on campus is not approximately five percent, but less than
one percent per year. 73 She goes on to admit that there is a five
percent. chance “that someone will try to fondle you or kiss you
against your will or pester you into having sex.”74 How harshly
should the law deal with these transgressions? Surely it depends on
the context. Few academics, however, have addressed the issue. 75
McElroy considers other assault reports deeply flawed
because of low survey response rates, misleading questions, and
overly broad definitions of sexual misconduct.
Regretfully,
attempting to reconcile the confounding differences found in the
disparate studies is beyond the scope of this study.
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One line of relevant commentary, however, needs to be noted,
a summary of which is provided by well-known journalist Cathy
Young, who writes about sexual assault:
Three quarters of female students who were classified
as victims of sexual assault by incapacitation did not
believe that they had been raped; even when only
incidents involving penetration were counted, nearly
two-thirds did not call it rape. Two-thirds did not
report the incident to the authorities because they
didn’t think the incidents were serious enough. 76
Whose measures of rape should be counted, the experts or the women
in question?
Philosopher Alan Wertheimer, author of books and journal
articles on ethics and sexual ethics, exfiltrated similar truths from
assault complaints. Citing well-known 1970s feminist writer Robin
Warshaw, he reported in his book “Consent to Sexual Relations” that
only twenty-seven percent of date rape victims perceived themselves
as such;77 that fifty percent of those claiming they were “forced” into
sex admitted that they were “in love” with their reputed victimizers;
and that forty percent of such victims dated their attacker after the
rape.78 Of course, follow-up dates with an accused attacker do not
disprove a sexual assault charge; such further connection may only
reflect a woman’s need to prove to herself that she was not assaulted,
and that she was in control throughout. But will anyone argue that
subsequent dates do not raise questions?
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WHAT CLERY REPORTS TEACH
Further insight into the incidence of sexual violence can be
gained through analysis of Clery data. 79 These are contained in
(Clery) reports that the United States Department of Education
(DoEd) requires colleges and universities to file annually on the
amount of violence, both sexual and other, on campus.
To protect consumers of education, i.e., students, colleges and
universities must also publicize the data on their websites or other
prominent places. DoEd has adopted a uniform definition of sexual
assault and requires colleges to train staffs to process complaints
fairly.80 Schools issuing misleading reports are threatened with loss
of funding—almost surely a fatal result.
A newcomer to Clery data would expect that its results would
match those of the Department of Justice and other large and wellfinanced studies.81 In fact, the average annual rate of college sexual
assault for 2001-2012, as reported in 2015, was .0003, or .03%, or 3
out of 10,000.82 The University of Oklahoma reported thirty-six
rapes for 2018 on a campus of 34,702 students, teachers and
employees; that is 10.37 rapes for every 10,000 people. 83 Columbia
University’s Clery report, examined in 2019, showed the rate of
misconduct to be as small as 3.5 rapes for every 10,000 students.84
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By contrast the “Obama” rate of approximately 5% is a full 174 times
that of the national Clery average of .03%. 85
Fairness requires mention of at least two relevant studies
holding that Clery numbers are unreliable. 86 It seems that university
administrations like to tamp down bad news and, at the same time,
students fear that any investigation would consume too much of their
time and emotional resources. Yet, with dozens of people working in
large university Title IX offices, surely including many women and
with serious penalties for misleading reports, it seems inconceivable
that universities could successfully implement the former type of
conspiracy. The main point here is that there is no little confusion
about the quantity of sexual assault on campus. Given the
uncertainties, we should hesitate before stereotyping men as rapists
and perhaps later denying individual men the ordinary protections of
due process. We come to this issue now.
HARVARD WOMEN SPEAK
By 2017, one could have reasonably imagined that
Brownmiller’s and MacKinnon’s influence would be waning after
Harvard Law professors Elizabeth Bartholet, Nancy Gertner, Janet
Halley, and Jeannie Suk Gersen (the Harvard Four) 87 published a
manifesto opposing Harvard’s investigative policies.88 Halley had
provided a preview in 2015, when she wrote that the training program
for investigators at Harvard is “100% aimed to convince them to
believe complainants, precisely when they seem unreliable and
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incoherent.”89 Since Harvard can hardly hold that a coherent account
of sexual assault should be less presumptively credible, we have a
case of heads the accuser wins, tails the accused loses.
In fact, the Harvard Four found that the proceedings they
examined on campus were “overwhelmingly stacked against the
accused,” so unfair, in fact, “as to be truly shocking.”90 Schools, for
example, were not letting accused students see complaints, or giving
them access to evidence, including names of witnesses. Moreover,
courts were overturning many college findings of male culpability. 91
Equally stunning is how such stark conclusions were not
leading to a major rethinking of process in sexual assault cases by
mainstream feminists. Gersen gets at the core positional differences
89

Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX Enforcement, 128
HARV. L. REV. FORUM 103, 110 (2015).
90
Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Fairness for All Students Under Title IX, HARV. LIBR.
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decries Victim-centered and Trauma-centered investigations. See Six Year
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VIOLENT
ENV’T
(2017),
http://saveservices.ecotechservices.com/wpcontent/uploads/Six-Year-Experiment-in-Campus-Jurisprudence.pdf. On the other
side is “Start by Believing” a program organized in 2011, a time when women’s
complaints may not have been taken as seriously as they deserved to be, by End
Violence Against Women International (EVAWI), whose goal was to train people
to talk empathetically to sexual assault victims. See Training Resources, START BY
BELIEVING, https://www.startbybelieving.org/resources/#training (last visited Nov.
1, 2020). For a rich account of the origins and much enlarged scope of the
campaign known as Believe the Woman campaign, see Believe the Victim: The
Transformation of Justice, STOP ABUSIVE & VIOLENT ENV’T (2018),
http://www.saveservices.org/wp-content/uploads/SAVE-Believe-the-Victim.pdf.
For a recent book-length analysis of campus sexual proceedings, see EVAN
GERSTMANN, CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS (2018).
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&
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(2019),
http://www.saveservices.org/wp-content/uploads/Appellate-Court-CasesReport.pdf (pointing to investigative and hearing failures, among others, a study of
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accused students).
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in current rape discourse: “Lots of people disagree about where to
draw the line. But most [laypeople] would want to draw the line so
that there is such a thing as consensual sex.” 92
INCREDIBLE WOMEN
Towards the end of 2017, theories of women’s innocence,
male predation, and the relative sexlessness of women came together
in “Incredible Women,” an article by Northwestern Law School
Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer. 93 In the context of widespread
reported sexual misconduct—which helped bring on #MeToo—the
author began by suggesting that, unlike in the case of other alleged
crimes, police and prosecutors were not believing women, and that
women’s complaints were languishing in files.94 Moreover, women
were doubting themselves or otherwise refusing to come forward,
thus making it too easy for victimizers to victimize again.95 Without
acknowledging key psychological factors at play in sexual assault
cases, Tuerkheimer’s simple message to decision-makers—a bold
repudiation of due process—was to believe women when they charge
assault.96 With no ifs or buts provided by Deo, inculpation would
mean culpability.97
Others voiced similar opinions. Wanting to curb the
misogyny she discerns in the administration of acquaintance-rape
cases, Cornell law professor, Sherry Colb, argues that a rape charge
“is an eyewitness account of a credible person. The denial of an
accused rapist, by contrast, is entitled to little evidentiary weight as it
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is explained by a desire to avoid conviction.” 98 This position might
seem harsh to those with sons or brothers whom they might want to
protect against unwarranted accusations. It is the broader legal
ramifications of this position, however, that are most troubling. By
this logic, all testimony of all defendants—male and female—could
be largely ignored. A woman’s assault complaint would be more
than enough to convict.
Can those who have fully lived life be confident that a
woman’s testimony about sexual assault is trustworthy, while that of
a man who contradicts her is not? Is Colb perched on a bridge too
far? “I believe that women lie just as often as men do,” answers New
York Times columnist and Pulitzer Prize winner Bret Stephens in the
heat of #MeToo.99 Though not a law professor, Stephens sounds like
one: “I believe the standard ‘presumed innocent’ must always trump
the slogan, ‘Believe Women,’ if we intend to live in a free and fair
society.”100
To some extent, surely, Tuerkheimer was on the mark. In
view of the thousands of completed but unprocessed rape kits around
the country, the authorities have not done enough.101
In
discouraging, and perhaps prohibiting investigators from following
up doubts throughout an investigation, however, she was blithely
curtailing traditional due process rights of men. Query: if a nonnegligible number of women suffer from some kind of self-deception,
a topic we will come to, 102 would not insisting on due process for
men be critical?103
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Undergirding Tuerkheimer’s view, and strongly implied in
her writing, is that a charge of sexual assault should be analogized to
one of robbery. Since no one wants to be robbed, it seems fair to say,
when a woman reports a robbery, listeners will tend to believe her.
But readers may see that rape is fundamentally different from robbery
in that it requires sex, which may well have—pace some female
activists—been welcomed, indeed craved.
Wait! The reader will, rightly, interject here, what might a
woman’s libido have to do with a sexual assault claim? The woman
in question will certainly not bring charges if she consented. She is
too on to herself or too honor-bound; suggesting otherwise is rank
sexism. In many cases yes. But what about the others?
A VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES
For this purpose, we need to get back to the Henry-Hilda
that men and women purposefully fill up with drink, go to a
party, pick someone up, get further soused with him or her, and make
out. From this point, they invite or get invited to a dorm room, after
which they disrobe and have sex. 105
Does it overtax the imagination to consider that, later, the
woman might bring a sexual assault charge against the man? Help in
resolving the seeming paradox is provided by Professor Joan
Howarth, committed feminist and former law dean at Michigan State,
who for years adjudicated sexual assault proceedings on campus.
Writing in 2017—more than fifty years after the first sparks
of the sexual revolution—Howarth relates that when she began her
adjudicatory work she had expected to find women’s “widespread
comfort with sexuality and confidence in seeking sexual pleasure.” 106
This perception was perhaps founded on T.V. and movie
presentations of sexual behavior. What she discovered in the sexual
assault files instead were “seemingly bottomless pits of shame about
sexuality.”107 Likely arising from guilt, this shame would explain
story104
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why many young people who willingly have sex are nevertheless
unwilling to say “yes.”108
More specifically, Howarth’s Title IX field experience taught
her that “many highly accomplished women students suffer from
sexual identities that are painfully constrained [and] fearful.” 109 The
shame and fear were pushing them towards Title IX offices. How?
As a result of feeling that sex is owed to their pursuers in today’s
free-wheeling campus hook-up culture, Howarth writes, a number of
“women experience very little control or autonomy over their own
sexuality, [which] can lead to the enforcement regime being activated
to vindicate honor, provide safety from a third party [i.e., boyfriend],
reinforce identities of sexual innocence, protect against jealousy, or
protect young women from falling from someone’s grace.”110 To
deny having consented can be useful as “a safety net to catch
someone from falling from ‘good’ to ‘slut.’” 111 By contrast, “[t]o not
be considered a slut, a disloyal girlfriend or fiancée or a ‘tease,’”
Howarth sums up, “can be very important, perhaps crucial, to a
young woman’s identity and well-being.”112
Reporting specifically on the sources of her own ambivalence,
New York Times Gender Editor Jessica Bennett has explained why,
at the age of nineteen, she had unforced but far less than ideal sex
with an acquaintance twelve years older. 113 The sex, she claimed,
arose out of “fear (that I wasn’t as mature as he thought), shame (that
I had let it get this far), and guilt (would I hurt his feelings?).”114
While sexual shame can easily lead to underreporting of
assault, Howarth goes on to explain, some women may have a “deep
self-interest to . . . diminish any role in suggesting consent” when
108
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making claims.115 They may “have complicated pressures to
exaggerate the harm that they suffered, substitute certainty for
uncertainty about exactly what happened, or pursue serious penalties
for conduct that may not be considered serious by others. Unpleasant
and unwelcome as this reality may be,” she adds, “we should
recognize it,”116 because as a matter of personal—as opposed to
social justice — “‘we believe you’ does not translate fairly into
individual adjudications.”117 Believing women, that is, can be a trap
for a fair-minded adjudicator.
This author has found no other women adjudicators who
speak of the psychological underpinnings of women’s sexual assault
claims.118 Howarth’s solo standing in this matter, however, should
not undermine confidence in her findings; after all, calling into
question some women’s reliability as complainants and witnesses
would undermine, just to start with, the professed goal of one
feminist leader who comes to the academic table “not to deliver the
truth but to inspire social change” i.e., to increase women’s power.119
Such a risk may explain why feminist writers stay away from
women’s sexual insecurity. It is one thing if women’s relative
weakness arises out of men’s muscle and financial power. However,
if it is sexual ambivalence that stands in the way of women’s wellbeing, how can men be largely responsible? Since it is also possible
that women may not know their own sexual minds, this cannot help
but, among other things, raise the troubling question of whether there
might be other decisions that women are not well-positioned to make.
THE ENEMY WITHIN
If female Title IX adjudicators have neither corroborated nor
refuted Howarth’s findings, at least one man has, Brett Sokolow,
President of ATIXA (the Association of Title IX Administrators, with
3,600 members across the country), expert witness in over fifty
115
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lawsuits, and a well-published author on Title IX.120 What stands out
in his experience are young women’s lack of resilience, absence of
coping skills, and susceptibility to mental-health crises, resulting
from compulsive sharing of stories by a number of women
empowered by . . . [survivor] groups who are going
around claiming victimization for something they
absolutely believe happened, for which they are
experiencing trauma, [and yet] did not occur—because
they don’t have contact with reality the way the rest of
us do. I wish I could figure out why that’s happening .
. . but it is happening a ton.121
A harsh judgment to be sure; which makes it even more
unfortunate that we do not hear from other adjudicators about
their experience in the trenches.
Horwath and Sokolow, it should be clear, are speaking not
only about false rape reports, i.e., complaints that are known to be
false, but also, and more important, about confusion over the
elements of sexual assault. 122 To the extent that they are right,
assessing complainant credibility needs “a ton” more attention than it
has been given.
The foregoing authors’ experience helps explain why, in
relation to the number of sexual assault complaints, relatively few
college men are found culpable. 123 Their observation at the same
time suggests that men in these cases—though surely not to the same
extent as women—have been victims too, hence the need for robust
due process. Put otherwise, Howarth and Sokolow would want
readers to consider that complainants might indeed have shown what
many men and women would understand as consent.
THE HELPFULNESS OF HELPLESSNESS
If feminist activists seek greater power for their sisters, how
to explain Janet Halley’s finding fifteen years ago, for which
See Leadership, ASS’N TITLE IX ADM’RS, https://www.atixa.org/about/our-team
(last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
121
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considerable evidence has already been presented, that feminists have
“a profound commitment to an understanding of themselves as utterly
without power”? 124 A presumption of powerlessness, it turns out, can
be expedient. It can, for example, bolster the claim that to protect
women, law schools badly need more women faculty, more women
deans, higher women’s salaries, and correspondingly faster and more
reliable promotions to tenure; but how many more women is
sufficient, and at whose expense?
Women of course should be treated even-handedly. But
others may deserve jobs and higher salaries too based on their
achievements. Most will agree that women faculty have had a harder
time than men in our academic history. But does it beggar belief that
ambitious women, however much marginalized, might take undue
advantage of newly acquired influence wherever they can?
Over twenty years ago, surely with women activists in mind,
among others, Black Harvard Law professor Randall Kennedy
warned that unless inhibited,
every person and group will tend toward beliefs and
practices that are self-aggrandizing. This is [not only]
true of those who inherit a dominant status . . . Surely
one of the most striking features of human dynamics is
the alacrity with which those who have been
oppressed will oppress whomever they can once the
opportunity presents itself.125
What this means practically, especially now, thirty years later, is that
“it is not premature to worry about the possibility that . . . historically
subordinated groups will abuse power to the detriment of others.” 126
One need not believe that all interest is self-interest to know that
some is.
Bret Stephens explains how groups now press for influence in
the culture wars; “the quickest way to acquire and exercise power is
to take offense.”127 Offense at what or whom? Perhaps at the simple
suggestion that women should control their drinking because more
124
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than forty percent “of sexual assault events involve alcohol
consumption by the victim.”128 Should such a suggestion be
condemned for blaming the victim? Kipnis mocks such a selfexculpating feminist ploy in her riff: “[w]omen don’t drink; men get
them drunk.”129 (Or, as the comedian Flip Wilson’s character
Geraldine used to say, “The devil made me do it!”).
TAKING THE RED PILL
Besides teaching young women and men about the need for
forethought and self-restraint, a prescription that is front and center of
“Sexual Citizens,”130 good pedagogy requires instruction on what can
happen when a man not implausibly claims that he had consent, when
there are no physical injuries or witnesses, and when, without
coercion, the woman placed herself in a position that offered a
reasonable expectation or at least hope of further intimacies.
One need not go all the way with Paglia that accompanying a
man to a bedroom during a boozy fraternity party is “consenting to
sex.”131 For example, it can hardly be oppressive for the law to
respond to a complainant in the following manner: you seem honest
and well-balanced, you have the right to change your mind at any
time, you might well have been the victim of a sexual assault and
having to relive that experience may be searing, especially when you
have to face your victimizer and complete strangers; but because (1)
the accused not incredibly avers that he had consent; (2) for all the
denials, pace MacKinnon, women in fact often want sex and indeed
“frequently get drunk in order to have sex;”132 (3) no one forced you
According to one report, forty-three percent of “sexual assault events” are linked
to alcohol use by the victim. Sexual Assaults on College Campuses Involving
Alcohol,
American
Addiction
Centers
(May
8,
2020),
https://www.alcohol.org/effects/sexual-assault-college-campus.
See Antonia
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into the dorm room of the accused, your actions at the time displayed
intimate interest in the man, and specifically, while kissing per se
does not amount to consent to intercourse, it may not be unconnected
to it;133 and (4) you have provided no evidence, direct or indirect, of
your non-consent—say, through witnesses or, indirectly, through
similar charges by other women against the accused—we cannot find
blameworthiness beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by clear and
convincing evidence.
That assaults are greatly underreported to police is not
relevant in any particular case. We destroy any chance of personal
and communal well-being if we do not reject MacKinnon’s
touchstone for political and moral equity: “I call it rape whenever a
woman has sex and feels violated.” 134 Feeling violated, Howarth has
implied, must not be the test. 135
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
How do we set rules that come down hard on sexual
misconduct and at the same time allow space for healthy sex to
flourish? As to misconduct, we can start by holding erstwhile culture
heroes, like Harvey Weinstein, to strict account for browbeating
unwilling women into submission, while trying to persuade them that
they really are consenting; this behavior is unconscionable.136 The
law cannot protect men who are beholden to their tumescence; they
need and must be given what Gustave Flaubert famously called a
“sentimental education.”137
At the same time, we must support the almost entirely
unheralded, but no less important, message that women need a
133
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sentimental education too, especially on the need to assume
responsibility for their libidinal selves. 138 In such a setting, among
other things, we could look forward to fewer claims from women like
Bennett that they did not really want to do it, that they did it out of
“fear (that I wasn’t as mature as he thought); shame (that I had let it
get this far); and guilt (would I hurt his feelings?).”139 Instead, if they
had post-coital regrets, future Bennetts would admit: “regretfully, I
badly needed it”; “I hadn’t been touched by a man in a long time”;
and “my friends were all enthusiastically doing it while feeling sorry
for me or poking fun at me for being alone. I just felt left out.” It
should be noted here that even in her own account the New York
Times Gender Columnist makes no reference to fear of violence.
No one will doubt that, especially in the contemporary
environment, calls on men from any corner to exercise a high
standard of civility and constraint in their own sexual behavior are
appropriate and necessary. By contrast, experience teaches that at
least some readers will think it insensitive and intrusive for a man to
call on a woman to own her own sexuality, not least because this can
come at a considerable personal price. As Kipnis readily admits,
“Sexual honesty, about women as desiring beings, making our own
sexual choices (sometimes even terrible ones), can be painful.” 140
Katherine Angel has succinctly identified the sources of this pain:
slut-shaming, harassment, cultural proscriptions, and “susceptibility
to male violence.”141 In this setting, “How can we know what we
want,” she ruefully asks, “when knowing what we want is both
demanded of us and a source of punishment,” 142 “when knowing
one’s own mind is such an undependable aim, 143 and when having to
articulate it nevertheless is “oppressive[?]”144
138
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Insights such as these, while intriguing, have failed to
persuade Kipnis, who urges women to fully accept their sexuality;
and not only for the obvious reason of having more satisfying sex. 145
In the absence of women’s sexual honesty with themselves, she
warns, “no sexual equality is ever going to be possible [in any
realm.]”146 Can she be wrong?
If we continue to hold, like Angel, that a woman cannot fully
consent, no sex act will be deemed morally and legal safe and, one
might add, we will continue to have the same desultory conversations
with the same old and sad complaints. Are we prepared to live
indefinitely in a world where there can be no knowable moral or legal
consent? Recognizing sexual drives and admitting to sexual intent,
on the other hand, should lead to less shesplaining about women’s
sexual innocence and fewer demands, however tantalizing, that
Harry—and only Harry—be thrown out of school for drunk sex with
Hilda at the end-of-finals bash.147
Writ large, when women continue to blame men for their own
unhappiness, Kipnis adds (speaking as perhaps no woman law
professor ever has), fair-minded observers lose focus. Women’s
“preoccupation has been in getting society to change . . . and getting
men to change,” when, in truth, the underlying problem is that
women “tend to overvalue men and male attention in ways that make
us stupid and self-abnegating,” and that what women need now are
“prolonged bouts of self-reflection.”148
That the law cannot readily free women from the burden of
self-reflection should be clear—unless, that is, we can successfully
raise the age of consent to, say, thirty years, or deal with the sex-
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alcohol link, neither of which seems likely. 149 Amidst our drunken
and reluctant sex, then, and in the absence of the soul-searching, there
will be no let-up in distressing accounts such as Bennett’s, or worse,
in stomach-turning accounts of young women who go to bed with
men largely out of fear of being dumped only to find themselves
dumped just the same. 150 In the end, then, are we not in a situation
where, as Pogo’s twin sister might have said, “We have met the
enemy, and she is us”?151
CONCLUSION
The drive for power that may have led some feminists to
excess should not obscure other contributing factors. Arthur Koestler
helps to identify one of them: “If power corrupts,” the famed midtwentieth-century novelist and essayist suggested, “the reverse is also
true; persecution corrupts the victims, though perhaps in subtler and
more tragic ways.”152 How, exactly? By encouraging us to give in to
feelings of hurt, and oppression, thereby preventing us from fairly
assessing and then improving our condition? But why should women
invite feelings of oppression? Koestler doesn’t say. The great
Russian novelist Dostoyevsky begins an answer: “The deeper the
grief,” he taught, “the closer is God!”153
Why? Perhaps because, as some Christian saints have done,
we can train ourselves to see pain not as evidence of bad luck,
149
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behavior, or planning, but as a sign of cosmic significance; that
would explain all those frightening yet uplifting medieval accounts of
self-mortification in print and in art. 154 Specifically, in this view, our
suffering connects us to the Divine and allows us to absorb life’s
deepest meanings. Women as saints? Not fantasy, according to a
leading scholar of our language, rhetoric, and culture wars.
Mistrustful of what we might call holy-culture-warriors, John H.
McWhorter has recently, with no little irony, situated them next to
God by labeling them “[t]he [i.e., God’s] Elect.”155
The sacralization of pain does not of course mean that claims
of injury, being specious, can be ignored; it means, rather, that our
stories, both men’s and women’s, must be interrogated. It is not
enough in this view to Talk Truth to Power; the “powerless” need to
hear truth too.
In a similar way, Koestler and Dostoyevsky can help us
understand the self-righteousness in the discourse examined here and
salient in much other discourse on sex. 156 Since God is in my corner,
I must be right. It should be clear what we need now is conversation
flowing from the widest range of hearts and minds.
To the extent that dissenting male voices today are absent
from legal discussions of sexual behavior, the silence is surely due
also to a toxic idea, rooted in our fractious and identarian academic
world, that any outsider who challenges my group’s self-conception,
one that lies at the core of my identity, in this case my sexuality, must
154
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hate me. But does women’s vulnerability in the sexual domain
extend to vulnerability to discourse on sex? Is talk violence? Are
legal scholars so insecure that dissenting opinion must be dismissed
as hateful and harmful? The link can be explored. Did Justices
Scalia and Ginsburg regularly socialize at the opera only in spite of
their jurisprudential conflicts?157 Criticism is not odium.
In the fissiparous world we live in, we should now be able to
see that feminism needs the diversity of men’s input, confirmatory or
critical, to truly succeed. Asking men to suppress their own voices
does not promote respect for women or, by extension, get us all
where we need to go.158 Rather than “shutting down . . .
conversation[s] by citing male privilege”—which Meghan Daum
charges feminists with doing 159—law professor Nancy Levit, author
of a primer on law and feminism, urges women to “try to foster
men’s interest in writing about gender issues and [in] interpreting,
adopting, expanding on, and reacting to feminist ideals and
methodologies,”160 all of which are goals of this essay.
In other words, less sisterhood and more siblinghood are
called for now. If we can give up the untamed energy that comes
from having a clearly identified all-powerful enemy, if we can talk
openly to one other, scholars holding differing positions on feminist
issues might find common ground. By tamping down our dudgeon,
in short, we might all enjoy some gender peace.
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